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## TREND TOWARD RIVAL BLOCS ENDANGERS UNO

MORE than a week has passed since former Prime Minister Churchill spoke before an American midwestern audience on March 5. The speech has attracted wide attention, and on March 11 *Pravda*, official Communist organ in Moscow, charged that his proposals were clearly a threat of war. Yet his plea for a "fraternal association" between the United States and Britain, backed by an outright military alliance, and his strongly worded criticisms of Russia have not been placed in their proper public perspective by government officials either in Washington or London. In the meantime, events reveal increasing Big Three differences that call for the most fundamental examination of our foreign policy—especially its relation to the United Nations Organization which, according to President Truman's only direct reference on March 8 to Mr. Churchill's speech, we are continuing to support with vigor.

**GROWING TENSIONS.** Mr. Churchill's note of urgency is only one evidence of Big Three tensions. Both the British and American governments have sent stiff notes to Moscow, similar in content and tone, protesting Russia's failure to withdraw its troops from Iran by March 2, as had been previously arranged. Washington reports of March 7 indicate that Moscow now supports claims, put forward by the Armenian Republic of the USSR, demanding return of the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan. British and American fears are also aroused by Russian plans for a change at the Dardanelles, known to be on the Soviet agenda. The USSR, on the other hand, sent a note, made public on March 8, to Washington, protesting that America's memorandum of February 22 to Bulgaria on the broadening of its left wing government, was a violation of the Moscow Agreement—an interpretation which

Secretary Byrnes, in turn, flatly rejected on March 11. In the meantime, by March 10, Russian army forces in the Far East had withdrawn from the troubled city of Mukden, where fighting has since broken out between Chinese Communist troops and Central government forces. But reports about Manchuria continue to reveal differences between the Allies on the political and economic future of that area, China's most industrialized region.

### HOW GREAT ARE BIG THREE DIFFERENCES?

Any interpretation of Mr. Churchill's speech must recognize that he has pointed up quite bluntly many of the present conflicts among the Big Three. In America and Britain, Mr. Churchill stands virtually alone as an elder statesman who warned against those policies which led directly to the conflict with the Axis powers. Yet the fact that he has failed to clarify fully the grave issues he exposes leads to two important questions. First, if relations among the Big Three are as strained as Churchill implies, why do not members of the American or British governments, now holding official positions, so inform their constituents? Secondly, do Mr. Churchill's proposals offer the next best step to resolve current Big Three disputes?

President Truman has thrown the mantle of free speech about the eminent British visitor, and it appears that neither the President nor the State Department cares to support Churchill's analysis and recommendations in full. Yet there has been no categorical denial that the Administration favors those views. The same may be said of Prime Minister Attlee and the Labor government in Britain. Perhaps the soundest interpretation that can be placed on the resulting tacit approval of an Anglo-American military alliance is that such a coalition is inevitable if war occurs. Much criticism has been

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heaped on statesmen of the periods before the last two great wars for not having made it unmistakably clear that the western democracies would fight together against German aggression. And today, if war is imminent, a storm warning is also needed. But in such a case official spokesmen should fully inform the electorate in both Britain and America about the precarious status of Big Three affairs.

For lack of clear official statements about Mr. Churchill's proposals, the British and American public may well be disturbed about their future course abroad. There can be no doubt that if Britain and the United States must combine for security reasons, as they have in two past world wars, then their policies must also be examined jointly in the economic realm, and in connection with the dependent areas under their sovereignty. This Mr. Churchill failed to do in any thorough fashion. He can hardly be unaware of the continued criticism in this country of British policy in Palestine, India, and other parts of the Empire. Moreover, his speech reflected little understanding of the historic reluctance with which the American people approach anything like preventive war which, in effect, his words implied. Nor was his message designed to make any easier the Washington Administration's task of convincing Congress that it should pass the \$3,750,000,000 loan to Britain. Because he found it possible to override these basic practical considerations, there is even greater need for official interpretations to place his proposals in their proper light.

**NEXT STEP — UNO OR SEPARATE BLOCS?**  
The Churchill thesis may be explained on a narrow view of British interest, for it is quite evident that Britain's empire outposts are being severely threat-

ened not only by Russian actions, but by rising colonial nationalism. Thus harassed, the British empire may naturally seek aid for defensive purposes. But Churchill and any other Big Three statesmen, who give lip service to the belief that differences between the western powers and the USSR will be resolved by erecting tightly knit blocs to operate within the structure of the UNO, either misread the possibilities of that nascent world organization, or desire to use it merely as the machinery to carry forward a power struggle which will surely lead to World War III.

It is unrealistic to suppose that the UNO has sufficient independent strength to prevent conflicts among the Big Three. But the next best step would not appear to be a division among them either within or outside the UNO's framework. When the UNO has not been fully launched, when the United Nations have thus far only the barest plans for world economic cooperation, and when the major issues of international control for the production and use of atomic energy have yet to be decided, it is too early to adopt policies which by their very nature lead to exclusive combinations. In an age when every analysis of international problems reveals the need for world-wide solutions, it may appear superficially logical that, if full agreement is unattainable, limited arrangements or alliances are necessary. Yet it is but a measure of the changed nature of world affairs in the atomic era—involving in effect a new logic—that half measures will be futile. To fail in pursuit of broader agreement may result in war, but separation into opposing blocs will inevitably lead to that tragedy.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN

## **FRENCH YIELD TO CHINESE AND ANNAMITE DEMANDS IN INDO-CHINA**

Since mid-October the Annamite uprising against the French in Indo-China has been over-shadowed by the fury of the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch, but the headlines have recently shifted once more to significant developments in France's Far Eastern possession, which contains more than one-third of the inhabitants of the French colonial empire. Two important agreements have been signed by the French—one with the Chinese on February 28 providing for the withdrawal of Chinese troops from the northern half of Indo-China, and the other with Annamite nationalists on March 6. In the latter, according to Admiral Georges Thierry d'Argenlieu, French High Commissioner in Indo-China, the French recognized the Viet Nam Republic (Viet Nam is the ancient name for Annam) as a free state within the Indo-Chinese Federation and the reorganized French empire. Ominous predictions that the Annamites would fight French efforts to land troops in the northern province of Tonkin were upset by this unexpected settlement, for on March 8 the

French entered the port of Haiphong without opposition, although two days earlier a sharp exchange of fire between French warships and Chinese shore batteries had delayed the French landings. According to a French Foreign Office spokesman, this incident resulted probably from the fact that the Chinese local commander had not been informed of the treaty arrangements.

**ANNAMITES WIN CONCESSIONS.** The unexpectedly peaceful return of the French to Tonkin may be attributed to the realistic concessions which Admiral d'Argenlieu evidently carried back to Indo-China after his recent recall to Paris. In addition to recognizing the Viet Nam Republic's authority in Tonkin and that part of Annam north of latitude 16°, the French are reported to have conceded at least two other important points. A plebiscite is to be held to determine whether the Viet Nam Republic is to be extended to include southern Annam and Cochin-China, and French troops are to be removed gradually until all have been withdrawn from

the new state at the end of five years. The agreement provides for a temporary occupation force of 15,000 French and 10,000 Viet Nam troops under an overall French command. The French had set a precedent for negotiations by signing on January 6 a treaty with the ruler of Cambodia, another of Indo-China's five regions, granting the Cambodians an autonomous government with French technical advisors and French control of foreign affairs and defense.

Explosive events in Southeast Asia since V-J Day have accentuated the necessity of carrying out to the full French war-time promises to grant Indo-China a new political status. Among notable influences on French policy has been the presence in Indo-China, north of the 16th parallel, of more than 100,000 Chinese occupation troops under General Lu Han, who are there by Allied agreement, to disarm and repatriate the Japanese. Officially the Chinese troops have remained neutral but they have disarmed French citizens and shown their sympathy for Annamite nationalism in numerous ways. In the treaty of February 28, the French not only had to abandon their extraterritorial rights and special concessions in China but, in order to persuade the Chinese to withdraw, had to grant them extensive rights on the railway which connects the Chinese province of Yunnan with the Indo-Chinese port of Haiphong.

The Chinese position has also embarrassed the French because it enabled the Annamites to strengthen their organization. Under the dynamic leadership of President Ho Chi Minh, who claims the support of eight million members of the coalition Viet Minh party, the Republic of Viet Nam held on January 6 the country's first general elections to choose 400 members of a National Assembly. Every Annamite over 18, male and female, literate and illiterate, had the right to vote for representatives who had to be at least 23 years of age and able to read and write. Although the French ridiculed the elections, charging irregularities and coercion at the polls, the returns revealed a landslide for Ho Chi Minh's party not only in the north but even in the French controlled south from which the results of clandestine balloting were carried to Ho Chi Minh's capital in Hanoi by a Chinese soldier motorcyclist.

**GUERRILLA WAR STILL POSSIBLE.** In addition to the prestige brought to the Viet Nam Republic through the elections, the French have to face the fact that Ho Chi Minh's armed forces have grown steadily. While the French, in agreement with British forces stationed in the southern zone, have

moved in troops until Major General Jacques Leclerc is said to have 60,000 men under his command, Annamite guerrillas have fought delaying engagements, suffering an estimated 4,000 casualties, and have retreated into the northern zone. That the French reconquest of the south is complete was indicated on March 4 by an announcement from Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten's headquarters that Indo-China would no longer be in the Southeast Asia Command after midnight that night. But in the north Ho Chi Minh is said to have an army of 50,000 men, ill trained and poorly armed perhaps, but ready to retire to the hills and fight a prolonged guerrilla war supported by native peoples who have been subjected to intensive anti-French indoctrination by Annamite teachers during the past six months. Obviously generous concessions on the part of the French were necessary to prevent an explosion.

Another symptom of this dangerous situation was the recent news from Saigon that on two occasions groups of French soldiers had assaulted French demonstrators who petitioned the government to recognize the Viet Nam Republic. Finally French policy was very likely influenced by the significant Cabinet change following the resignation of General de Gaulle. On January 28 the old Ministry of Colonies, now renamed the Ministry of France Overseas, was taken over by the Socialist Marius Moutet, who ten years ago tried to introduce reforms in the French administration of Indo-China when he was Minister of Colonies in Leon Blum's Popular Front government.

The burden of proof remains on the French. If the spirit in which they carry out their agreement with the Viet Nam Republic is progressive and far-sighted, they may be setting a significant precedent for future peace and order in Southeast Asia. A valuable step forward would be the replacement of Admiral d'Argenlieu by a civilian High Commissioner. Last spring the issue of whether to place a civilian or a military man at the head of the new Indo-Chinese régime was warmly debated in Paris between an old guard of colonial military men and a progressive wing of colonial reformers. The appointment of d'Argenlieu was a victory for the military, but the reformers have not lost hope.

VERNON MCKAY


*China's Postwar Markets*, by Chih Tsang. New York, Macmillan, 1945. \$3.50

The author, a Chinese businessman, surveys China's potentialities as a market, and goes into considerable detail concerning both imports and exports.

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# Washington News Letter



## LOCAL AND NATIONAL INTERESTS CLASH OVER ST. LAWRENCE TREATY

A flaw will mar the "special relations" between the United States and Canada, to which Winston Churchill referred in his address at Fulton, Missouri, as long as the United States fails to ratify the Deep Water Treaty which the two governments signed in 1932. The treaty provides for a system of wide canals around the International Rapids of the St. Lawrence River, through which ocean vessels could pass and then ply the Great Lakes as far west as Duluth, and for the construction of a dam at International Rapids which would create 2,200,000 horsepower of hydroelectric capacity.

**CASE FOR THE WATERWAY.** Today the recognition by the United States that it is a world power, and the uncertainties of international relations, render the arguments of the project's supporters more formidable than they have been in the past, when Congress twice rejected the treaty—first in 1934, and again in 1944. Since February 18 a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been holding hearings on a resolution that embodies the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Agreement of 1941, which includes the 1932 treaty.

The case for the Waterway rests partly on the security needs of the United States and its northern neighbor at a time when the attention which the War Department is giving to Arctic defenses underlines Canada's growing military importance. The existence of the Waterway might strengthen Canada economically and increase its western population. And by turning the cities on the Great Lakes into ocean ports, the Waterway could decrease isolationism in the American Middle West, since the traffic would disclose the advantages of world trade.

Moreover, the new route could reduce the burden on the railways of the United States during periods when commodities awaiting shipment exceed available car space; and the manufacture of electric power at International Rapids would greatly increase the industrial capacity of the United States. In a message to Congress on October 3, 1945, President Truman recalled that electric power from the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Columbia River Basin had made possible the program of military airplane manufacture during World War II. Secretary of War Robert Patterson on February 18 wrote to the State Department that the Waterway would strengthen national security as a "reserve route" to an area where ships might be built and repaired in relative safety.

Opposition to the Waterway nevertheless remains strong. Since the accord between the federal government and New York State for the division of power from the proposed hydroelectric plant requires that "no part of the United States share of the water in the International Rapids section shall be diverted for the benefit of any persons or private corporation," private power companies, especially in New York State, have reasons for hostility toward the St. Lawrence Waterway, although they have not taken part in the hearings. The center of opposition in New York State is the city of Buffalo, which depends for some of its prosperity on the movement of commodities from the Middle West to the eastern seaboard through Buffalo.

Railway labor fears that the Waterway would divert much railway traffic to ships on the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence route. The coal mining industry objects on the ground that the Waterway would enable foreign countries to send coal by ship to the north-central United States at a lower price than Pennsylvania producers can send it by rail. Maritime New England believes that the opening of seaports in the Middle West would harm Boston, the northernmost of the large Atlantic ports of the United States. The Mississippi Valley Association opposes the project for fear that goods now transported to the sea southward along the Mississippi would move eastward through the Great Lakes. Louisiana and Texas have been unfavorable because of the possibility that New Orleans and Houston might lose some of their sea trade to the Great Lakes ports.

**OUTLOOK FOR APPROVAL.** The political complexion of the Waterway debate is somewhat different today from what it was in 1934 and 1944. Formerly the effort to pass or defeat the Treaty has resulted mainly in a struggle between Senators whose states stood to benefit or lose from the treaty. There are, however, a large number of Senators from disinterested States to be attracted to one side or the other. Some might oppose the Treaty because of its expense; others might favor it for its contribution to national security. The campaign in the Senate in favor of the Waterway is now led by Carl Hatch, Democrat from one of the disinterested States, New Mexico. Since he is chairman of the subcommittee which is holding the hearings, the Waterway resolution probably will be sent to the Senate with a favorable report. The resolution requires both Senate and House approval.

BLAIR BOLLES